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SEA SHEPHERD: 
The Evolution of an Eco-Vigilante 
to Legitimized Maritime Capacity Builder

Message from the Editors
This case study focuses on the evolution and development of a non-state 
group — Sea Shepherd — in the maritime domain. While some might 
argue that this organization is too small to warrant the attention of the 
U.S. Navy, others, including the author, argue that its cross-jurisdictional 
activities and international reach provide important insight into how other 
groups, or even states, with small maritime capabilities, might challenge 
international maritime norms. 
The author, Professor Claude Berube is an accomplished maritime historian 
and Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.  He uses these two lenses  
to examine Sea Shepherd’s evolution: from its early, personality-driven 
phase to a private multi-ship organization that confronts illegal fishing 
operations across thousands of miles of open sea. The author asks how the 
Sea Shepherd was able transition from a legally deemed pirate organization 
to a respected nonprofit organization working in concert with countries 
globally. To provide an answer, Berube delves deeply into the organization’s 
evolution, command and control structures, strategic communication strat-
egies, logistics, fundraising, and its global intersection with small navies and 
coast guards.
The case study does not shy away from the controversial aspects of Sea 
Shepherd’s historical development, but also asks important questions  
about the organization’s future: What are the barriers to it gaining more 
international legitimacy (recruitment and funding)? Why would other small 
navies and coast guards work with this group, or future organizations that 
choose to mimic its techniques and practices, going forward? In the 21st 
century, and in coming decades, what other maritime non-state groups — 
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from armed groups to private contractors — may challenge the dominion 
of states who seek to protect and control the vast maritime commons that 
are the world’s oceans? How exactly should the navies of the free world 
interact with such groups?  Professor Berube’s case study on one such 















Sea Shepherd: Eco-Vigilante to Legitimate Actor
In April 2015, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society ship Bob Barker 
completed a 10,000-nautical-mile, 110-day chase of an illegal fishing 
trawler, the Thunder, from the Southern Ocean to West Africa, which 
would culminate in the scuttling of the trawler, the rescue of its crew, and 
the successful prosecution of its captain. Over the course of the chase, the 
Bob Barker worked with more than two dozen countries as well as Interpol. 
This event was a game-changer for Sea Shepherd, which had a four-decade 
history of touting itself as a “pirate” organization taking action on behalf 
of marine life. With the chase of the Thunder, Sea Shepherd demonstrated 
a willingness to work with nation states, and those nation states gave some 
legitimacy to it in return. This case study examines Sea Shepherd and also 
weighs the organization’s value as a business model for responding to the 
growing scarcity of marine food and the economic and national security 
implications of that challenge.
Courtesy of SeaShepherd.org
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On December 3, 2014, the Bob Barker got underway from Australia. Its 
crew of nearly three dozen represented several different nationalities. The 
Bob Barker was built as a whaling vessel a few years after the end of World 
War II; when the mission started, it was on the registry lists as a fishery 
patrol vessel.1  At 800 tons, it was one of the larger vessels in Sea Shepherd’s 
maritime force and was the group’s flagship.
Sea Shepherd captain Peter Hammarstedt was one day shy of his 30th 
birthday. A Swedish-American from Pennsylvania, Hammarstedt grew 
up with the organization he served and believed in. Like the midshipmen 
and officers during the Age of Sail, he worked his way through the posi-
tions on his organization’s various ships to attain command. He developed a 
strategy, understood the logistics challenges ahead, and practiced the tactics 
he learned over the 12 years he has spent with the organization. He was 
caricatured on an episode of Comedy Channel’s South Park in 2009, and he 
has charisma and the respect of the crew, earned after committing himself 
to more than a decade on maritime campaigns.2 In person, Hammarstedt 
is intelligent, articulate, worldly, and possesses a good-natured sense of 
humor; he also has a depth, a steely conviction that would have made him 
a formidable opponent in the Age of Sail, or as any fellow officer in today’s 
navy competing for promotion.3  
Captain Hammarstedt’s goal was to stop the poaching of Patagonian 
toothfish, which has been rebranded in the United States and sold under 
the name “Chilean sea bass.” 4 Marine protein is growing scarcer as fishing 
stocks are depleted due to overfishing and illegal fishing. “We adapt to 
diminishment,” said Sea Shepherd founder Paul Watson. “As we overfish 
one species, [humans] target a previously uncommercial species and make 
them commercial.” 5 
World per capita fish consumption is at historically high levels, accord-
ing to the 2016 “State of World Fisheries and Agriculture” report of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Fish 
consumption has doubled in the past 50 years. A major contributor to 
the depletion of fish stocks is illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing. According to the World Wildlife Fund, “more than 85 percent of 
the world’s fisheries have been pushed to or beyond their biological limits 
and are in need of strict management plans to restore them.” 6 FAO moni-
tors 600 marine fish stocks and has reported 3% as “underexploited,” 20% 
“moderately exploited,” 52% “fully exploited,” 17% “overexploited,” and 
7% as “depleted.” 7 Reports of IUU fishing have varied based on regions. In 
the U.S., for example, 20 percent to 32 percent of imported wild-caught 
seafood is illegally caught; in other regions, it is as high as 50 percent. 
Globally, illegal fishing is an annual $23 billion industry, which will likely 
rise as fish stock diminishes and consumer demand rises.
Illegal fishing trawlers can and do operate in the territorial waters of some 
states, usually those with a navy or coast guard that is too small or unfunded 
to secure those waters. They also exploit marine sanctuaries because those 
also lack proper enforcement mechanisms. For instance, the Galapagos Island 
Marine Reserve sees some 300,000 sharks removed annually.8 But the 
greatest opportunity for illegal fishing trawlers and their criminal networks 
is the open ocean, particularly in locations where few military or commer-
cial ships operate. Unchallenged, they can sweep broad swaths of ocean of 
marine life. 
One such area is what Hammarstedt terms “the Shadowlands” near the 
Banzare Bank, off Antartica.9 There he hoped to find some sign of the 
Bandit 6—the nickname given to six rogue fishing trawlers wanted by 
Interpol.10 Due to changing registries, flags of convenience, and operational 
patters, these trawlers, including the Thunder—the most “notorious” of the 
six 11—failed to be found, stopped, and prosecuted by any nation’s navy or 
coast guard ships. Two weeks after Hammarstedt left Australia, he found 
the Thunder. 
A second Sea Shepherd ship, the Sam Simon, under Captain Siddarth 
Chakravarty, departed after the Bob Barker. Hammarstedt challenged the 
Thunder and began a chase on the high seas. For the next 110 days, Bob 
Barker tailed the Thunder and reported the illegal fishing trawler’s position, 
photographing it, gathering information, and using tactics to either slow 
it down or communicate with the crew. The chase continued through ice 
floes and 25- to 30-foot waves in some of the most isolated waters on earth. 
When they reached the waters 400 miles south of Africa, the Thunder 
“began making circles” 12 to conserve fuel. It was the start of what Ham-
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marstedt termed “the great drift.” 13 Unsure how long this standoff would 
last, he assessed that the remaining fuel (370,000 litres) consumed at 500 
litres per day would enable them to remain on station for two years. Because 
each Sea Shepherd crew is vegan, the ship had an ample supply of rice and 
beans to allow them to survive if necessary. The drift lasted months.
The chase then continued up the west coast of Africa, outside the territorial 
waters of Namibia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon. 
At one point, a legitimate fishing trawler joined in to work with the Sea 
Shepherd ships. One hundred and ten days into the chase, the Thunder’s 
captain abandoned ship and attempted to scuttle it 80 nautical miles 
of Sao Tome and Principe rather than be caught with the evidence. The 
captain likely chose Sao Tome to scuttle the ship because the island nation 
only had boats capable of operating about 20 nautical miles off the coast, 
so there would be no threat of discovery of its criminal actions by local 
forces. Smaller—and even larger—littoral states that do not have the funds, 
platforms, or capability to enforce their own waters increasingly find that 
illegal fishing vessels exploit this weakness. Three crew members from the 
Bob Barker boarded the sinking vessel, photographed toothfish in the hold, 
seized cell phones, computer hard drives, and nautical charts. All evidence 
was turned over to Interpol via German police in what had become the 
longest maritime pursuit in history. By pursuit’s end, Sea Shepherd had 
communicated and coordinated with two dozen countries. 
By March 2016, the remaining illegal trawlers of the Bandit 6 had been 
captured or sunk in part due to Sea Shepherd. By July 2017, Sea Shepherd 
had assisted in the arrest of six illegal trawlers.14 For an organization that 
had been declared pirates by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and terrorists  
by other entities, it was now operating with nation states in legitimate 
protection of fisheries.
The evidence in the case of the Thunder was used in the prosecution of 
the captain and two of his officers. They were convicted, given three-year 
prison sentences, and fined 15 million euros. Hammarstedt, who was at the 
trial and provided testimony, was later named as one of 20 candidates for 
the 2018 Pritzker Emerging Environmental Genius Award.15  In February 
2019, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO)—Liberia’s 
highest military award—by Liberia’s president at the 62nd anniversary 
celebration of Armed Forces Day.16 Both Hammarstedt and Sea Shepherd 
were recognized for their support of the Liberian Coast Guard against 
IUU fishing. Such experiences and honors were a significant change for an 
environmental activist who had been arrested only a few years before in 
Canada for filming the killing of a seal. 
Sea Shepherd is responding to the growing crisis of fish depletion rates. 
The presence of fewer fish, particularly in littoral regions of small states, 
has an immediate economic impact on nation states that have insufficient 
resources to patrol their own waters in response to illegal, unregulated, 
and unreported fishing. Countries like China can thus readily encroach on 
global fish stocks. The organization has succeeded in countering illegal fish-
ing where private maritime security companies had hoped to but failed. 
As Somali piracy manifested itself as a threat to commercial shipping off 
the Horn of Africa in the first decade of the 21st century, nations were slow 
to respond. They considered the threat too low-level for naval assets to be 
employed, particularly as there were too few ships to patrol the region. 
Instead, they left the problem for shipping companies to contend with. 
One response in the shipping industry was the reluctant addition of armed 
guards—the deterrent that seemed to be the most effective. Companies 
emerged offering services such as armed boats to escort commercial ships 
through the dangerous Gulf of Aden or the western Indian Ocean. A few 
of these companies found some success, while most failed. Blackwater, for 
example, tried to offer a patrol vessel of its own that, upon arrival in the 
Middle East, lacked clients willing to work with it. But anti-piracy escorts 
were not the ultimate goal, according to Blackwater’s founder, Erik Prince: 
I think we can build a business model around enforcing a country’s fishing 
laws. We’d provide a boat like this. We’d take a fisheries officer or two 
from the host nation and we’d go out and enforce their laws and we’d get 
compensated by enforcing license fees and if there are repeat violators, you 
seize the boat. There’s impound fees to get the boat out. And we build a sus-
tainable  fisheries industry which will put locals to work. It’s their water for 
200 miles. . . . In terms of piracy or illegal fishing, I think by dollar volume 
there’s a lot more illegal fishing going on the world than there is piracy.17  
sea shepherd: the evolution of an eco-vigilante  9
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While Prince was not the only private security firm to propose this,18 none 
succeeded. An NGO—Sea Shepherd—filled that market vacuum by doing 
exactly what Prince had proposed.
How did Sea Shepherd emerge and change? This case study argues that 
three distinct phases define Sea Shepherd’s evolution since its founding in 
1977. These phases are based on organization, finances, platforms, meth-
ods, and missions. Phase 1 was characterized by vigilantism, driven by one 
individual’s vision and the necessity to bring attention to the movement 
by nonlethal kinetic methods. Phase 2 was defined by the movement’s 
popularization, largely due to a cable television series showcasing the 
organization’s anti-whaling activities. The success of this phase enabled 
the organization to grow, raise money more easily, and expand awareness 
among advocates and environmental agnostics alike. The ongoing Phase 3 is 
a period of growing legitimization in which larger campaigns are conducted 
in concert with nation states. What shape the organization will assume in 
future years is uncertain.
Figure Intro 1: The evolution of Sea Shepherd
Phase I Phase II Phase III
 Goal End whaling, sealing, etc. End Japanese whaling End IUU fishing
 Strategy Challenge on site
Reduce ability of Japa-
nese to kill whales
Legitimate partnerships 
with host nations
 Operations (annually) 1 or 2 3 or 4 18 to 24
 Tactics Media attention, sinking Chasing, ramming
Localized patrols with 
armed law enforcement 
detachments
 Platforms Old, slow Variety
New build or former 
state assets
Notes
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    CHAPTER 
ONE
Phase I: Vigilantism on a Shoestring (1977–2006)
Sea Shepherd’s first 30 years is important in understanding the organi-
zation’s lengthy genesis. Its founder, Paul Watson, led with a top-down 
approach for its few paid staff and volunteers. From 1977 to 2001, Sea 
Shepherd conducted one or two missions annually, mostly focused on seals, 
whales, and in a few instances tuna. It primarily used former fishing trawlers 
that had endurance but lacked speed. The group conducted kinetic and 
dangerous activities such as sinking other vessels in ports. It conducted 
itself like a vigilante organization, mostly due to Watson’s belief that it was 
doing what policy or enforcement officials could not or would not do. In 
many cases, it was held accountable like a vigilante group. 
Watson’s home office is filled with awards for his work, an extensive array 
of books, and models and prints of past and present Sea Shepherd vessels. 
He also has historical models such as the Confederate commerce raider 
Shenandoah, which attacked the Union’s whaling fleet in the Pacific (a 
strategy previously used by Captain David Porter’s USS Essex during the 
War of 1812 against British whalers). 
Courtesy of SeaShepherd.org
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“The [American] Civil War saved three species of whales. Under the 
command of James Waddell, the Shenandoah never killed anyone,” said 
Watson, who considers the captains of the Shenandoah and Alabama as 
role models. Watson also recounted the story of the Shenandoah’s first 
officer, Dabney Scales: “Upon boarding a Yankee whaler, the captain asked 
Scales, ‘Why are you preying upon a defenseless merchantman?’ to which 
Scales replied, ‘Because we’ve entered into a treaty both defensive with the 
whales to vanquish their mortal enemies.’ Now he said it as a joke . . . but all 
the places I’ve fought for whales they fought in the same regions.” 19 
“I intend to change the world,” Watson wrote in 1994, 17 years after  
founding Sea Shepherd. He recounted a conversation in which anthropolo-
gist Margaret Mead said, “There has never been any positive social change 
initiated by governments or institutions. All progressive change has to come 
about because of the actions of individuals or small groups of individuals.” 20 
Such a boast may have seemed far-fetched when he was growing up in the 
fishing village of St. Andrews in New Brunswick, Canada. However, the orga-
nization he founded in 1977 still exists as of this writing. It has grown from a 
one-man operation to encompass thousands of volunteers and their Watson-
issued mantra “direct action.” The issues he has fought for—both literally and 
figuratively—have gained in national, regional, and global scope.21 
At eighteen, Watson joined the Canadian Coast Guard, briefly serving on 
a variety of ships including a buoy tender, then went on the high seas as a 
merchant seaman. During this time, he also began his life of environmental 
activism. His first foray was with the Don’t Make a Wave Committee in 
Canada, which protested nuclear weapons testing in Alaska. The organization 
evolved into the Greenpeace Foundation in 1972, in which Watson was 
an early founder. During the early 1970s, the committee and Greenpeace 
began using ships to protest incidents that impacted the environment. His 
activities garnered the attention of those studying eco-terrorism. In one 
assessment, the author provides a profile that suggests Watson’s background 
was not uncommon for terrorists.22 
Ships became the mainstay because they were an attractive symbol to the 
media covering and consequently promoting their activities. Dr. Rebecca 
Gomperts sailed with Greenpeace in the late 1990s and founded Women 
on Waves in 1999, which provides abortion services on ships off the coasts 
of countries that restrict this procedure. When asked why she used ships, 
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she said “the ship is the visual.” 23 Similarly, the sight of a 100,000-ton air-
craft carrier sends a message to potential adversaries, and a Chinese hospital 
ship in the Caribbean and South American waters attracts media coverage. 
Watson would take his environmental fight to sea, and the image of an  
activist ship would be one of the game-changers in Sea Shepherd’s existence.
In 1975, Watson was a crewman aboard a Greenpeace ship pursuing Soviet 
whalers off the coast of San Francisco. Canadian journalist and activist 
Robert Hunter was with him aboard the fast Zodiac boats and had the 
idea “to get between the harpoons and [sperm] whales.” 24 The Zodiacs were 
able to provide proof of the whalers’ activities using still photographs and 
videos, which would become a staple of the organization.
In the 1986 movie Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home, the Federation space-
ship is placed between a Soviet harpoon vessel and the whales in order to 
save the whales. This echo is no accident. It illustrates another Watson and 
Sea Shepherd staple—ties to Hollywood. Watson says he gave actor William 
Shatner, who plays Federation Captain James T. Kirk, a line from the D.H. 
Lawrence poem “Whales Weep Not” that was used in the film. Was this  
accident or opportunity? Either way, it illustrates Sea Shepherd introducing 
its goals to a broader viewing public and popularizing its cause. 
Watson learned the value of constant, consistent messaging while with 
Greenpeace, later writing: “Not a week passed . . . that we did not put out 
some sort of a public statement on our news story . . . it attracted wide 
public attention to our campaign.” 25 In Watson’s own words, “they were 
growing expert in propaganda . . . our efforts would all be wasted unless we 
could focus public attention on the message: Quit killing sea mammals.” 26 
From University of Toronto Professor Marshall McLuhan, Watson learned 
that “the medium is the message . . . the media defines culture, and thus  
defines reality as it is perceived by human population.” 27 Effective employment 
of media means understanding what medium is needed. Television requires 
images and sound bites. Newspapers call for facts and a good headline. Sea 
Shepherd’s media machine has been expert for over 40 years in capturing 
the attention of traditional and new media, particularly with the television 
series Whale Wars, as we’ll see in Phase II of this study. Watson carefully 
documented each of his activities, whether anti-seal hunting or anti-whaling 
campaigns, or bringing attention to an issue with the support of Hollywood.
16  maritime irregular warfare studies 
The use of Hollywood actors is particularly effective in garnering media 
attention and is, for example, a standard tactic on Capitol Hill. When a 
committee wants coverage, it will have an actor testify as well as experts. The 
same holds true for animal or environmental rights. In 1976, the defense 
of Canadian baby seals, which were being clubbed to death for their fur, 
received the attention and time of actress Brigitte Bardot. When she arrived, 
so did the cameras and wider media coverage. Margaret Trudeau, the wife of 
the Canadian prime minister at the time, added to the star power when she 
announced that she would “never wear a baby seal.” 
Both Sea Shepherd and Watson received support from celebrities, including 
Dutch action star Rutger Hauer. After Hauer died in 2019, Watson wrote 
in tribute: 
In 1997 I was held in a Dutch prison awaiting an extradition trial to 
Norway for sinking one of their illegal whaling ships, the Nybraena. I was 
held for 120 days and received incredible support from the Dutch public 
and most notably from Rutger Hauer who twice visited me at Lelystad 
Prison. Rutger helped mobilize other celebrities and the Dutch court 
ruled to release me without extradition to Norway.28 
Music groups provided fundraising opportunities as well as outreach to 
new generations of potential followers. For example, less than two years 
after their founding, the band the Red Hot Chili Peppers played a concert 
in support of the organization.29
One measurement of effectiveness in media is the number of publications  
discussing an organization or issue. Sea Shepherd received moderate media  
response during Phase I. A year-by-year search of publication reports found 
that for the first 15 years of its existence, it received on average less than 50  
stories per year. For the next 15 years, it averaged more than 300 reports. Most 
of these stories focused on the group’s vigilante aspects—attacking ships, 
arrests, and so forth. But in the world of activism and fundraising, sometimes 
even negative attention can be preferable to being ignored and unknown.
Policy changes are a major determination of how successful an organization 
is beyond simply attracting attention. Here as well, Sea Shepherd has had 
many successes, including the end of the Iki Island dolphin hunt in Japan 
and the Irish seal hunt in 1983, a 16-year hiatus of Icelandic commercial 
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whaling beginning in 1988, and a Canadian moratorium on salmon hunt 
in 1995, to name just a few.30 
Watson’s experience with Greenpeace did not just teach him about media; 
he also learned valuable lessons about using ships against other platforms. 
The Dalniy Vostok was a 5,700-ton fishing trawler pursued by a chartered 
Greenpeace ship, the Phyllis Cormack, in 1975. Phyllis Cormack was a 
35-year-old wooden-hulled fishing boat. At less than 100 tons, it was 
dwarfed by its prey. Further, its top speed was only eight knots, less than 
half the speed of the Soviet whaling ships. 
Using data compiled by the Bureau of International Whaling since the 
1930s that included the latitude and longitude for each identified whale, 
Greenpeace had developed a profile of where whaling ships were likely to 
hunt. When the Phyllis Cormack arrived in the area, it heard Russian com-
munications over the radio and knew they were close.31 The chase ended 
after only 40 hours because it was running out of fuel. Nevertheless, the 
mission was not without success: The crew aboard a Zodiac had filmed a 
Soviet whaling ship firing its harpoon at a whale, and the film was picked 
up by broadcaster Walter Cronkite on the CBS Evening News.32  
Watson realized that he needed ships with range; the platforms he selected 
had to be appropriate for the mission. For the next mission, Greenpeace 
leased the James Bay, a 150-foot former Canadian Navy minesweeper with 
greater fuel capacity and the capability to deploy Zodiac boats.33  34  
Figure 1.1  Number of media stories, 1979−2019
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In 1977, fellow Greenpeace members deemed his tactics too controversial and 
direct. According to Watson, they objected to his taking a club away from a 
sealer and throwing it in the water.35 He was voted out of the organization as 
being “too activist” and acting as a “one-man vigilante squad.” He writes:
That struck me as both extreme and unfair. But the attention to the orga-
nization seemed directed more now at working out little boxes and chart 
and creating an international complex of Greenpeacers that would be 
controlled out of a super-headquarters in Vancouver.36  
That was the last lesson he would take away from his years with Green-
peace—in his view, the group spent too much time organizing and fund-
raising rather than taking action that had results. “A million dollars in newly 
raised funds,” Watson has argued, “would not make a man or a woman face 
up to clubs and harpoons.” 
For an organization to succeed, it has to grow and decentralize. For Watson, 
this meant not building a large organization that had to be paid for through 
continual fundraising. On one voyage, Watson found “no matter how 
much we paid the hired hands, they were never satisfied. The volunteers 
worked hard and long, rarely balking at tasks assigned to them. They were, 
therefore, to be preferred.” 37 This preference has remained a staple of Sea 
Shepherd. The organization has a small paid staff to support basic functions 
and relies on volunteers for everything else. With administration costs thus 
far lower than other organizations, Sea Shepherd can devote most of its 
resources toward its campaigns.
With a mission and only $100, Watson founded Earthforce in 1977, which 
would later become the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. His strategic 
view was based on three fundamental laws: (1) all forms of life are interde-
pendent; (2) diversity promotes stability; and (3) all resources are finite. As 
a result, he opted for direct action rather than nonviolent action, which, he 
argued, “has seldom produced beneficial change.” 38  
The following year, he met with author and animal rights activist Cleveland 
Amory and convinced him that the way to confront seal hunting was with a 
ship, which was less dangerous than flying in, as Greenpeace did. Watson prom-
ised to find a vessel and within two weeks identified a trawler for $120,000. He 
wanted a fishing boat because of its durability and economic benefits: “They 
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are built to operate in the roughest of seas, and, because the margin of  
profit is rather close in the fishing business, their engines are miserly in fuel 
consumption.” 39 With speed, capacity, economy, and efficiency, a 206-foot-long 
deep-water trawler was christened as the first Sea Shepherd. Watson’s selection 
of ships since 1978 is similar to private maritime security companies during 
the Somali piracy crisis in the early 21st century, which sought durable craft.
With no money to run the Sea Shepherd, he partnered with Dr. Bill Jordan 
with the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, who 
agreed to provide fuel. After a seal hunt in March 1979, Watson decided to 
pursue the pirate whaling ship Sierra, which had been condemned by the 
International Whaling Commission.
The Sierra was typical of oceangoing vessels: owned by one country, flagged 
by another, and sailed by an international crew. (Today, even Sea Shepherd’s 
ships follow this model.) Watson confronted the Sierra in dramatic fashion:
With 18 tons of concrete in her bow, Sea Shepherd was sure to survive, but 
14 seamen left anyway. Watson and two others put to sea in a vessel that 
normally requires a crew of eight. Within minutes Sea Shepherd crossed 
Sierra’s bow, sheared off her harpoons, then wheeled around and hit her 
square amidships, ripping up deck and damaging the port cargo hold.40
The Sierra was rammed “in such a way that no crew members would be 
hurt.” 41 Given that no one can be certain how a ramming incident could 
unfold, such a kinetic and dangerous method is extremely risky. It is in 
Watson’s favor that no one has died or been critically injured from his 
tactics. The U.S. Navy has suffered far more casualties from accidents (such 
as USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain) than Watson or Sea Shepherd 
ships have caused. Regardless, the incident was condemned by both the 
local authority (Portugal) and the IWC. Such has been the history of Sea 
Shepherd—direct action for violations and criticism for acting.
“Finding Sierra gave us momentum,” Watson explains, but as a new organi-
zation, the group had its challenges. Volunteers had to pay $1,000 to crew 
the ship (today they only pay for their transportation to the ship). When 
the Sea Shepherd got to Panama, it had no money to pay the canal fee, so 
Watson gambled at the Washington Hotel casino and won. At a later stop 
in Alexandria, Virginia, he got donated fuel from a concrete tank, but with 
no ability to extract it other than manually, the crew had to transport 30 to 
40 tons of fuel via a bucket brigade.42 Watson got underway from Bermuda, 
but Shell Oil refused to sell him fuel. He eventually chased Sierra to Portugal, 
where it was rammed, then scuttled.
If Phase I of Sea Shepherd’s history is heavily focused on Watson, it is 
not because he lacked disciples. Founding the organization with limited 
resources meant slow growth, but it did grow. From 1977 to 2007, the fleet 
size was stable, with only one or two ships at any time, and three ships in 
the fleet twice for brief periods.43 Seven different ships were employed over 
the course of 30 years. Some served for two or three years, while three were 
in service for more than a decade. One—Divine Wind—only survived 
one campaign in Iceland and had to be scrapped after a ramming. Whales 
Forever was damaged during an engagement with the Norwegian Navy. 
Cleveland Amory was impounded by the Canadian government. The last 
ship during this period (Sea Shepherd III, which was renamed Ocean War-
rior (I), and then Farley Mowat) was phased out in 2008. One, the Steve 
Irwin, became a mainstay and flagship of the fleet until 2019. Most of the 
ships during Phase I were comparatively slow but durable trawlers.
Sea Shepherd began testing the waters of public-private partnerships in 2000 
by providing resources to Ecuador’s Galapagos province. With insufficient 
resources to patrol the 27,000 square miles of water from illegal fishing 
and poaching, the Galapagos National Park Service has worked with Sea 
Shepherd to provide that coverage, including the installation of automatic 
identification systems (which allows shipborne transceivers on legitimate 
ships to be potentially distinguished from illegitimate ships). The Sirenian, 
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Figure 1.2.  Sea Shepherd fleet size
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a 95-foot patrol vessel, was donated by Sea Shepherd to the Galapagos 
National Park in partnership with the World Wildlife Fund, which donated 
$400,000 to repair the ship and rename it. Sea Shepherd also provided 
K-9s trained in Europe, built kennels, fed them, and found homes for the 
dogs when they were retired. They were used to monitor airports to iden-
tify poached sea cucumbers and shark fins.
Another public-private maritime partnership attempt during this phase of 
Sea Shepherd’s history was less successful. In 2011, the Pacific island nation 
of Palau signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Sea Shepherd in 
a public setting.44 Sea Shepherd agreed to support Palau’s anti-poaching 
efforts with a patrol vessel and crew. However, the agreement was termi-
nated by Palau when Japan promised to provide a vessel.45 According to 
Watson, he told the president of Palau that Japan would lean on them for 
the MOU; two weeks later, he says, Palau ripped up the agreement because 
Japan had threatened them economically.46 
Like criminal and terrorist organizations, Sea Shepherd has learned to 
operate between international legal seams and jurisdictions. Sea Shepherd 
contends that its activities at sea are guided by Sections 21−24 of the 
United Nations World Charter for Nature, which provides authority to 
individuals to act on behalf of and enforce international conservation laws. 
The group has filed criminal complaints against Japanese whalers in various 
jurisdictions, alleging wide-ranging infractions including piracy. Conversely, 
numerous legal actions have been taken against the Sea Shepherd organiza-
tion and its members.47 But is this interpretation of the Charter correct? 
International law professor Donald Anton argues that “the international 
legal context raises . . . insurmountable difficulties for this sort of private 
non-state enforcement . . . it is almost certainly unworkable at international 
law” and that “nothing in it authorizes the actions of Watson and Sea 
Shepherd . . . nothing in it confers authority on non-State actors.” 48 
Defining Sea Shepherd has been difficult. The organization has used a 
modified pirate flag as its logo, and Watson admits that they were “seen as 
vigilantes, revolutionaries, and nonconformists.” 49 This held throughout 
Phase I of its history. In 1983, Watson and another member were arrested 
in Canada for interfering in a seal hunt. Canadian police tried boarding 
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their ship but found electric barbed wire, leading to the crew’s arrest. In 
1986, Sea Shepherd sank two whaling vessels in Iceland. In 1997, Watson 
was arrested by Dutch police and served 90 days in prison. These are but a 
few examples, but certainly the norm for an environmental or animal-rights 
activist. Just as Gomperts said that ships provide a visual for media, so too 
can arrests. Legal challenges simply generated more publicity.
Had Sea Shepherd remained at this operational level with this philosophy 
and tactics as an eco-vigilante organization, it would not have grown. It 
would have stagnated and become marginalized as one among many environ-
mental groups. Several factors began to transform it, especially a television 
series that spanned the Phase II years—Whale Wars.
Discussion Questions
1.  Does the U.S. or its partners have the ability and will to replace Sea 
Shepherd capabilities with their own maritime security forces? Why or 
why not?
2.  What Sea Shepherd tactics could be emulated by the U.S. Navy or 
Coast Guard?
3.  How do you define the organization: a terrorist organization, pirate, 
eco-vigilante, private security firm, environmental activist, something 
else? Explain your reasoning.
4.  What challenges do states have working with Sea Shepherd or similar 
groups that use violence at early phases in their development? Why 
would a state be willing to cooperate with such a group? 
5.  Early in their existence, the Sea Shepherd crew were labeled pirates 
and terrorists. They later gained recognition as working in service of a 
greater good. Are there any currently existing groups you can think of 
(violent groups or peaceful NGO-type actors) that may have a chance 
of becoming partners with international institutions rather than being 
rhetorically exiled?
6.  When state actors partner with all-volunteer groups, is there a risk that 
attempting to institutionalize the work being done may damage, or 
otherwise alter, the incentive structure that made the volunteer group 
successful in the first place? 
7.  What lessons could the DoD/national security community learn from 
Watson’s commitment to persistent messaging?
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Phase II: Whale Wars (2007−2016)
“The world is a vampire.” So begin the lyrics to the Smashing Pumpkins’ 
song “Bullet with Butterfly Wings.” Billy Corgan, lead singer and founder 
of the Smashing Pumpkins, was a supporter of Sea Shepherd and would 
later serve on its board of advisors. Television viewers were reintroduced to 
this song in 2008 as the theme for a new show on the cable network Animal 
Planet’s new offering, Whale Wars. 
Although the organization’s overall strategy remained the same during 
Phase II, from 2007−2016, the reality television show fundamentally 
changed how Sea Shepherd operated, raised money, organized, and was 
perceived. During this phase, Sea Shepherd concentrated most of its 
resources on challenging whaling ships from the Japanese Institute for 
Cetacean Research (which hunted and killed hundreds of whales annually) 
in the Southern Ocean, and continued to serve as a vigilante organization. 
Whale Wars not only helped to popularize Sea Shepherd; it helped pave the 
way, despite several serious bumps, to later legitimacy.
    CHAPTER 
TWO
Courtesy of SeaShepherd.org
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In 2005, Sea Shepherd was labeled terrorists by the Director-General of 
the ICR,50 although not by the courts. However, on February 25, 2013, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth District ruled that the Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society is a pirate organization,51 noting:
When you ram ships; hurl containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes 
in the water to damage propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and 
flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other ships, you are, 
without a doubt, a pirate. 
According to Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of “any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew.” A lower court limited “private ends” to “financial enrichment,” but 
the Court of Appeals ruled that “private ends” is far broader than simply 
taking money, even though pirates historically have not attacked ships 
for any other reason than to take the ship, cargo, or ransom the crew. The 
definition of piracy does not include political ends—and this is where Sea 
Shepherd is different, since it does seek policy change.
The Ninth District ruling perhaps too broadly labeled Sea Shepherd, since 
the ruling did not distinguish its kinetic acts from its legitimate efforts. 
For example, Sea Shepherd is a 501(c)3 and has filed taxes and forms with 
the federal government each year of its existence. A “pirate organization” 
would, by definition, operate outside the bounds of government and 
provide no accountability. Further, Animal Planet would not have given a 
television show to Sea Shepherd if it was lawless; no one could argue that 
Animal Planet or another cable network would give a reality show to Somali 
pirates, who were at their height of activity during Whale Wars. That the 
fleet flies various national flags also suggests tacit approval, at least by some 
nations, thus affording it some legitimacy. Moreover, Sea Shepherd has 
worked with the sneaker giant Adidas to design a shoe made from plastic 
recovered from the ocean.52 Adidas is but one of a number of corporations 
involved with Sea Shepherd; none would risk litigation if the organization 
were an actual non-state actor such as a pirate or terrorist group.
Sea Shepherd is not just an organization, according to Watson: “it’s a 
movement.” 53 That may have not been true during Phase I since it had no 
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chapters, little diversity in its campaigns, and mostly focused on activities 
he organized. He was the mind and the voice of a new organization, but he 
was also the story. This changed during Phase II. 
While Watson was the primary star of Whale Wars, he also had a very visible 
cast of supporting characters, as well as multiple ships. In 2013, when he was 
an international fugitive, he had to step down from paid positions anywhere 
Sea Shepherd was registered. The court decision also prevented him from 
serving as a ship’s captain during the last campaigns in the Antarctic waters. 
However, he remained the organization’s notional leader and spokesman. 
Sea Shepherd began to adopt a model of franchising during this phase, 
decentralizing and empowering more national and local groups to become 
involved, organize, and broaden the missions. Sea Shepherd Global, based 
in the Netherlands, became the hub for most activity. The first chapter to 
appear was Sea Shepherd UK in 2005. It would take another five years until 
the next chapter was founded. 
Watson set three rules that a group had to agree to when applying to become 
a Sea Shepherd chapter. First, it could use aggressive nonviolence, but nothing 
could be done to risk killing or injuring someone. Second, a chapter could 
not compromise or make deals. Third, the chapter could not invest money 
into promotion and fundraising. That is not to say it could not fundraise; it 
simply could not spend money to do so. Chapters could then propose their 
mission to Sea Shepherd Global. In this way, Sea Shepherd expanded its 
activities from Phase I’s focus on whales and seals. Other chapter restric-
tions included the organization’s logo. Sea Shepherd Global and Sea Shepherd 
USA owned the logo, much like McDonald’s headquarters owns the golden 
arches. The organization went to court over improper use of the logo in 
at least two instances in Costa Rica and Mexico, the latter in which a dive 
company was selling t-shirts with unauthorized use of the logo.
Whale Wars was a boon to the emergence of chapters. In the view of one 
senior Sea Shepherd official, “Whale Wars was in its stride, and whaling 
campaigns needed a lot of money, so there was a push to increase all revenue 
to pay for this. Chapters were seen as ideal, but were also just part of organic 
growth due to the TV show going out to cable channels around the world.” 54
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Chapters emerged such as Sea Shepherd France, Sea Shepherd Australia, 
Sea Shepherd Netherlands, and elsewhere. “Each country’s entity is self-
reliant,” Watson explains. Each makes its own decisions, has its own board 
of directors, raises its own money, and determines its own campaigns. Sea 
Shepherd as a whole has fewer than 30 full-time employees and relies heavily 
on hundreds of ship-and shore-based volunteers. 
As of late 2019, Sea Shepherd had 54 chapters globally (see Figure 2.1). Prior 
to 2010, it had one, in the United Kingdom. In 2010, 14 chapters were 
created; the following year saw another 12. The number of new chapters 
fell dramatically after that, probably for two reasons. First, the market was 
saturated in the high-interest countries and cities during the first two years that 
chapters were allowed to be established. Second, Whale Wars was starting to 
lose viewers by 2015, so regular reminders about the organization’s existence 
tapered off. What the chapters’ development does show, however, is public 
interest in becoming part of a greater environmental effort. Despite this, as with 
other issues, no comprehensive assessment of the organization has been con-
ducted. Sea Shepherd itself is unaware when chapters exactly started because  
of its organic nature. “No one knows 100%,” one senior staff member wrote.55 
Phase II led to other organizational changes. While many of the Sea Shepherd 
entities may seem interchangeable in the media, they must be distinguished 
in order to understand the structure.
Figure 2.1  Sea Shepherd chapters 1977−2019
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Sea Shepherd, as its promotional material states, is a global movement to 
defend, conserve, and protect marine wildlife. Sea Shepherd Global is the 
coordinating body for all independent Sea Shepherd groups, except for the 
U.S.-based Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS), which is financially 
and legally distinct from Sea Shepherd Global and other national entities. 
In 2015, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the U.S.-based 
SSCS to pay $2.55 million to the Japanese Institute for breaching a 2012 
U.S. court injunction to stay clear of Japanese whaling vessels in the Southern 
Ocean.56 As a result, Sea Shepherd shifted roles and responsibilities for its 
Southern Ocean campaigns to Sea Shepherd Australia, while Sea Shepherd 
USA focused on litigation.57 Sea Shepherd Global can request funds from all 
entities based on what campaigns are underway and under whatever the entity 
banner is, whether Sea Shepherd France, Sea Shepherd Germany, or so on. 
The organization has remained lean. In 2016, Sea Shepherd USA had seven 
employees, Sea Shepherd France three employees, Sea Shepherd Global two 
Figure 2.2  Sea Shepherd areas of responsibility in 2019
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employees, and Sea Shepherd Australia seven employees. At any time, some 
450 volunteers are on ships and other campaigns. The organization can call 
upon some three thousand volunteers. Not all individuals applying to vol-
unteer are accepted. Each is vetted based on the skills needed for each ship 
and the skills they bring, as well as if they are joining for the right reason.58 
The injunctions and litigation also changed the organization’s funding 
structure. Tax records show it received between $1 million and $4 million 
annually from 2001 to 2006. Whale Wars ballooned revenues between 
2009 to 2012, when Sea Shepherd received roughly $12 million annually. 
Costs increased accordingly with the operations of new and more ships 
for its Southern Ocean campaigns.59 In some years, the organization spent 
about 85 percent on campaign programs, eight percent on administration, 
and only six percent on fundraising. Compare this to Greenpeace, which 
spends about 31 percent on fundraising.60 
During Phase II, the organization also adopted a military characteristic 
in naming its campaigns. The U.S. military names its campaigns, such as 
Operation Overlord or Operation Desert Storm. In 2007, Sea Shepherd 
launched Operation Leviathan, a major campaign against Japanese whalers. 
Figure 2.3  Total annual revenue, 2001−2016
2001-2016
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Others were named to provoke the Japanese, such as Operation Divine 
Wind (2011−12), the name for kamikazes and the storms that saved Japan 
in the 13th century from Mongol fleets. The mission of the campaigns also 
began to diversify as the chapters emerged. Beyond whales and dolphins, 
chapters identified localized marine life such as sea urchins and sharks. 
Between Whale Wars and court activity, Sea Shepard garnered extensive 
media attention during Phase II. From 2007 to 2015, the organization was 
mentioned or the subject of more than 2,500 media stories annually, more 
than an eight-fold increase from Phase I.
Phase II also represented an evolution in the size and makeup of Sea  
Shepherd’s forces. Three larger ships like the Bob Barker, Steve Irwin,  
and Sam Simon became the core of the new fleet, with the fuel capacity  
to conduct long-range, sustained operations. Sea Shepherd’s revenue stream 
includes direct support from public figures, and ships such as the above were 
named after benefactors. Sea Shepherd also named one of its helicopters, 
the Nancy Burnett, after the president of United Activists for Human 
Rights.61 Again, this is similar to the U.S. Navy’s practice. Admiral Hyman 
Rickover famously said that “fish don’t vote” when he changed the naming 
convention for submarines from fish to American cities in seeking congres-
sional support for the new Los Angeles-class attack submarine. 
Each ship had operational benefits. Due to Bob Barker’s fuel capacity, it 
served as a replenishment ship to the Steve Irwin and others. Each cam-
paign in the Southern Ocean suggests an adaption to changing conditions 
and an effort to find a specific working formula for that campaign. In 2009, 
the organization used the Ady Gil, a 78-foot-long high-speed trimaran, 
as a scouting vessel. A subsequent collision with a Japanese whaling ship 
resulted in its loss.62 In 2010, Sea Shepherd added a larger trimaran named 
the Gozira (again to taunt the Japanese with a derivative of Godzilla), later 
renamed after Brigitte Bardot. The ship was capable of 27 knots, faster than 
any other ship in the fleet. 
For most campaigns, the Steve Irwin had a helicopter for better reconnais-
sance. The fleet tested drones in 2011, but at least one proved difficult to 
maneuver in high winds. Jet skis were added the following year.
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Paint schemes for the ships have changed over time. Watson originally 
ordered the ships painted black since it signified change to the Japanese, 
based on their history with the first Portuguese ships and then the American 
squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854. While black ships 
were acceptable in Antarctic water, however, the color made the ships too 
hot elsewhere. The Steve Irwin received a blue, black, gray, and white dazzle 
camouflage pattern reminiscent of World War I when it transited the Gulf 
of Aden en route to the Libyan coast in 2011. Since this was during the 
height of Somali piracy, a large “77” was painted on the hull and wooden 
“guns” mounted to make it appear as a warship. The ruse apparently succeed-
ed, since pirates veered away and at least one coalition helicopter hailed it 
asking what country the “warship” belonged to.63
Sea Shepherd also has a rudimentary intelligence network using radio 
direction finding and tippers from cruise ship passengers and other vessels 
to locate the Japanese whaling fleet. What the U.S. intelligence community 
calls “opsec”—operational security—is in place. Passengers and crew are 
not permitted to send any email during a campaign that might suggest 
where they are located or what they are doing.64
Sea Shepherd’s mainstay tactic is to harass Japanese whaling ships to disrupt 
their operations, either through dangerous navigational practices or through 
intentional ramming. Additionally, small boats are used to launch attacks 
intended to be disruptive to whaling operations or the ship’s mobility. In the 
past, these attacks have including throwing rancid butter to taint whale meat 
and launching fouling lines to ensnare the ships’ propellers. Sea Shepherd has 
also launched teams to board the whalers. The organization’s use of media has 
been helpful in spreading news about campaigns, especially while underway. 
During one campaign, crew members included a live-stream operator so 
viewers could watch a real-time chase of Japanese whaling ships. 
Similar to illicit traffickers, illegal fishing trawlers, and historical pirates, Sea 
Shepherd will shift operations and flag registries from country to country 
as necessary to stay one step ahead of the law. At one point, the Steve Irwin 
was Dutch-flagged, the Bob Barker was Togo-flagged, and Ady Gil flagged 
in New Zealand. Because of the organization’s nonprofit status, they are 
not subject to the regulations of merchant ships. For example, at least one 
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ship is registered by the Netherlands as a motor yacht vice a motor vessel; 
a motor yacht does not require a qualified crew or even licensed captain, 
much like a small personal pleasure craft. This also gives Sea Shepherd far 
more flexibility when challenging other ships at sea: “commercial vessels 
are required to have a paid crew, whereas Sea Shepherd primarily crews its 
vessels with volunteers.” 65
Sea Shepherd crews became more international and experienced during 
this period. Approximately one-third of the crew had multiple deployments 
on its ships. 
A small boat capsized as it was being launched on Whale Wars, leading to 
criticism of the crew’s inexperience. Watson stated that this incident occurred 
during training: “The boat operator was not supposed to put people in 
when lowered but he was trying to impress a camerawoman.” 66  Jane Taylor, 
a former U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer, recommended checklists to 
improve safety and reduce launching time, but the first mate opposed 
them.67 Nonetheless, the crew has four-hour watches like naval vessels and 
has mandated shipboard training. On at least one ship, medical training 
was provided every third day of the campaign. The crew of Sea Shepherd 
ships also appears to be, on average, about a decade older than the average 
U.S. Navy ship crew.
After the first season of Whale Wars, crew began wearing a uniform of 
sorts—Sea Shepherd gear—which both “instilled a sense of professionalism 
and orderliness amongst the crew and also projected this image for the 
television cameras.” 68
While the ships were successfully garnering attention in the Southern 
Ocean, Watson was utilizing high-visibility board members and activists. 
For example, he sent board member and actress Pamela Anderson to Russia 
to speak about the transportation of whale meat. According to Watson, 
Putin put a stop to the practice after her appeal.69
Phase II was important for the organization’s evolution. The success of 
Whale Wars was not in stopping whaling, but in exposing Sea Shepherd’s 
work to a much larger international community beyond traditional en-
vironmental activists. Its appeal led to the organic emergence of chapters 
34  maritime irregular warfare studies 
throughout the world. Revenue through donations increased significantly. 
And, despite litigation that might have led to a different outcome for actual 
pirates or illegitimate non-state actors, Sea Shepherd achieved a proto-
legitimacy. Countries continued to permit it to flag its vessels, corporations 
partnered with it, and the reporting mechanism by which it remained a 
nonprofit organization in the United States demonstrated that it would 
not be disbanded. The organization built upon these issues to reach a turning 
point in its next phase.
Discussion Questions
1.  What are the risks and rewards of adopting the decentralized franchising 
model discussed in Phase II? How could those risks be mitigated?
2.  Discuss the implications if a more radical group emerged with the same 
maritime interests as Sea Shepherd.
3.  Sea Shepherd gained support and legitimacy in part because of the televi-
sion show Whale Wars. Discuss the role media can play in legitimizing 
these kind of groups.
4.  What are the advantages of having many decentralized chapters instead 
of a single organization? What are the disadvantages? 
5.  Are there other volunteer organizations that use a franchising model of 
growth similar to that of Sea Shepherd? Could this model be successful for 
an organization that operates in a less dramatic and TV-friendly way?
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    CHAPTER 
THREE
Phase III: Public-Private Partnerships in Maritime 
Security (2016−Present)
Sea Shepherd fundamentally changed after Phase II, transforming into a 
legitimatized actor in supporting traditional state functions. In Phase III, it 
has found how its interests align with some national interests on the ocean 
and has become pragmatic without losing its core mission. Some countries 
have recognized that they do not have the assets to protect themselves from 
the economic threat posed by IUU fishing and have partnered with Sea 
Shepherd for assistance.
Part of Sea Shepherd’s change has been the emergence of a new generation 
of leaders. It is unlikely this would have occurred had the fleet not grown 
with each Southern Ocean campaign. Watson has encouraged organic lead-
ership, saying, “I want someone who grows into the position, not because 
I put them there.” 70 Some say, however, that “within the SSCS . . . Watson 
acts as the supreme leader and dictator” or “anarchy run by God.” 71 Peter 
Hammarstedt, director of ship operations for Sea Shepherd Global, suggests 
Courtesy of SeaShepherd.org
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that the younger generation is more conservative and much more 
cautious in their approach.72 This was echoed by another captain who 
said that ramming ships is a thing of the past and that there are better 
way to achieve results.73 More importantly, Sea Shepherd now sees itself 
differently, Hammarstedt says: “It is not a protest organization; it is a 
law-enforcement organization.” 74 
Successive generations of nonstate actors tend to be more violent or activist 
in their approach. Competing insurgents in Iraq, for example, competed in 
one-upsmanship in their violence to gain more attention and support. Sea 
Shepherd has not experienced that effect because some of its more activist 
members have left to establish or join other groups. Sea Shepherd co-
founder Alex Pachecco (who was involved with the 1979 Sierra incident) 
became a co-founder of the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA). Kenneth O’Keefe, a former regional director for Sea Shepherd 
Hawaii, participated in the first Gaza flotilla raid. Rod Coronado, who in 
1986 helped sink two Icelandic whaling ships, went on to join the Earth 
Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front, both of which are considered 
domestic terrorist threats by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.75 Pia Klemp, 
who worked her way up ship positions during Sea Shepherd’s Southern 
Ocean campaigns, commanded two rescue ships in the Mediterranean Sea 
during the migrant crisis in 2018. Madeleine Habib, a former Sea Shepherd 
captain, has worked for Greenpeace, Médicins San Frontières, and, in 2016, 
the Freedom Flotilla Coalition’s Women’s Boat to Gaza, which was inter-
cepted by the Israelis.
Figure 3.1  Annual number of campaigns, 1977−2019
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In the meantime, Sea Shepherd has begun appealing to professional mari-
ners and military veterans. During the Southern Oceans campaigns, two of 
the more visible veterans were Taylor, the former SWO and a graduate of 
the U.S. Naval Academy, and Chris Aultman, a helicopter pilot who served 
in the U.S. Marine Corps. After retiring as the Italian Navy’s Chief of Staff 
in 2016, Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi joined Sea Shepherd as a deck hand 
and as of 2019 commanded Ocean Warrior.
Funding for Sea Shepherd remains relatively balanced. In 2012, its chief 
financial officer stated that approximately 84 percent of funding is derived 
from individual donors and 16 percent from merchandise. As a result of 
Whale Wars, the internal estimates were 60 percent from individual donors, 
10 percent from large contributors, and 30 percent from merchandise, as 
well as an annual 900,000 euros from the Dutch Postcode Lottery.76
The expansion of chapters significantly increased and diversified the envi-
ronmental issues being addressed. During Phase I, Sea Shepherd managed 
one to four campaigns per year. At the end of Phase II, it managed 10 
campaigns. In Phase III, it has managed up to 33 campaigns a year, with  
a range of missions.
One game-changer in Phase III was the construction of a ship from the keel 
up. The Dutch Postcode Lottery has an annual competition for funding to 
nongovernmental organizations. Awarded more than $9 million in a 2015 
“dream project” competition, Sea Shepherd built MV Ocean Warrior at a 
Figure 3.2  Campaign focus areas, 1977−2019
40  maritime irregular warfare studies 
Figure 3.3  Sea Shepherd ships by gross tons 
Figure 3.4  Sea Shepherd gross tonnage versus some nation states
Damen shipyard that constructed similar designs for the maritime security 
industry. The upgraded, steel-hulled ship launched in July 2016. It had 
more powerful engines than other ships in the fleet, room for a 14-person 
crew, and a large water cannon.
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Sea Shepherd also added former Coast Guard ships. Three former Island-
class cutters became the Farley Mowat II, the John Paul Deloria, and the 
Sharpie. A fourth Island-class cutter was purchased by Sea Shepherd, but 
as a result of new regulations it could not be used as a ship and was made 
inoperable by cutting the hull. The group instead used it for spare parts for 
the other three ships. In 2018, Sea Shepherd purchased the White Holly, a 
former U.S. Coast Guard buoy tender. With that addition, the organization 
had a functional fleet of 12 ships, and nearly all are built for endurance. 
Sea Shepherd’s fleet is nearly 4,000 gross tons. While this may seem insig-
nificant compared to a navy or a coast guard fleet, Sea Shepherd has a larger 
fleet than many smaller nations in terms of gross tonnage or, in some cases, 
the number of ships over 20 tons.
Critics may argue that Sea Shepherd ships cannot compare to these navies 
or coasts guard for two reasons: purpose and weapons. As Sea Shepherd 
has proven, most of its ships operate or have operated in blue water environ-
ments and in some of the most distant and inhospitable maritime climates. 
None of the countries in Figure 3.4 operate out of its own territorial waters. 
While an argument could be made that the other countries have armed 
vessels, Sea Shepherd does as well. Finally, Watson’s problem in Phase I with 
ships being too slow has been rectified, as the average speed of the fleet has 
increased significantly (see Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5  Fleet speed, 1978−2019
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Figure 3.6  Arrests/Fines, 2015−2019
Sea Shepherd also has an advantage regarding food, as the chase of the 
Thunder demonstrated. The ships are vegan. Without meat or dairy aboard, 
they do not have to report to the local Department of Agriculture for 
inspections. This facilitates quick entry and exit of any port and also saves 
money. The organization has tested methods of providing fresher produce 
for its crew. For example, the Sam Simon built a hydroponics garden because 
it had a large enough space. Most of the other ships in the fleet do not have 
the extra room, however.
No issue has impacted Sea Shepherd more in solidifying its legitimacy during 
Phase III than partnerships with countries in maritime law enforcement. 
Some partnerships have failed due to internal governmental opposition. The 
minister of fisheries for Senegal, for example, invited Sea Shepherd to con-
duct fisheries patrols for six months. According to Watson, the Senegalese 
Navy kicked them out because “we interfered with the navy’s money from 
the European trawlers.” 77 
Following the high-profile chase of the Thunder, Sea Shepherd was approached 
by other countries. Hammarstedt understood the opportunity—Sea Shepherd 
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had to work in partnership with governments that had inadequate resources. 
In various countries the on-board teams may be law enforcement, navy, 
coast guard, or fisheries officers.
Gabon was the first African country to reach out, in April 2016. Although 
up to 20 percent of Atlantic tuna is caught within Gabon’s territorial 
waters, the country does not have the assets to patrol its own waters. Sea 
Shepherd signed a ship rider agreement in which it would provide the plat-
form, crew, and fuel, and Gabon would provide an armed law enforcement 
detachment (LEDET) under whose authority the ship would operate. In 
2016 alone, Sea Shepherd, in its partnership with Gabon, conducted more 
Figure 3.7  Scope of success. (Courtesy of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society)
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than 40 boardings and inspections. This has acted as a deterrent to illegal 
trawlers that had not been boarded previously.
Since February 2017, Sea Shepherd has been working in partnership with 
Liberian authorities in Operation Sola Stella on joint at-sea patrols, which 
have resulted in the arrest of 14 fishing vessels for illegal fishing and other 
fisheries crimes. The partnership was recognized in an official government 
citation that was read during a celebration recognizing Peter Hammarstedt 
and the Sea Shepherd organization.
Since 2017, Sea Shepherd’s Operation Milagro in the Sea of Cortez (Gulf 
of California) has attempted to protect the vaquita porpoises. During one 
season, all three former Coast Guard Island-class cutters operated there, 
with Mexican navy and law enforcement aboard. Poachers have fired at Sea 
Shepherd’s drones, but the organization has removed more than 500 pieces 
of illegal fishing gear that threaten the porpoises.78 Mexico has given per-
mission to Sea Shepherd to confiscate nets. They can gather that evidence 
and turn it over to the navy.
Operation Jodari began in January 2018 with the government of Tanzania, 
resulting in 10 arrests.79 In early 2019, Sea Shepherd began working with the 
Namibian Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources to patrol its Exclusive 
Economic Zone. In August 2019, Operation Gambian Coastal Defense 
resulted in the arrest of 14 illegal trawlers within its first two months.80 In 
December 2019, Sea Shepherd worked with the Beninese Navy in arresting 
four fishing vessels.81 By these measures, Sea Shepherd has grown into an 
effective force in protecting some coastal waters from illegal fishing trawlers. 
It is ironic that the organization is partnering with Costa Rica to protect 
Cocos Island.82 In 2002, Sea Shepherd engaged an illegal vessel in Costa 
Rican waters, and 10 years later Watson was arrested on those charges in 
Germany, leading to his escape to Antarctica. In March 2019, the govern-
ment dropped its charges against him.83 Six months previously, the Costa 
Rican Minister of Environment called Watson “a hero.” 84 The pariahs and 
eco-terrorists had become part of the solution.
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Discussion Questions
1.  Under what scenarios, if any, might the U.S. might partner with  
Sea Shepherd? 
2.  Mao’s theory of revolution also uses three phases. To what extent does 
the Sea Shepherd’s strategic development mirror those stages? How  
does it differ?
3.  One key point of Sea Shepherd’s branding is non-lethal engagements.  
If that changed, what would the repercussions be? How could they  
be mitigated?
4.  How might an illegal fishing syndicate diminish Sea Shepherd’s  
effectiveness? If a state sponsor of illegal fishing wanted to remove Sea 
Shepherd’s ships from working with partner nations, what tools might 
be at its disposal? 
5.  Does the existence of Sea Shepherd result in a net gain or loss for the 
navy or coast guard of any particular country in terms of their own mis-
sions? Are they in any way delegitimized? 
6.  What are the ramifications (legal, political, other) of law enforcement 
personnel conducting official duty as passengers of an NGO’s vessel?  
Are they at risk of losing any sort of protected status in the event of a 
confrontation with a vessel belonging to another nation? If not, should 
they consider partnering in this manner?
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Phase IV: The Far Horizon (Present−?)
How long will Phase III last? Barring interference from governments, 
corporations, or other entities, it is sustainable in the near future. The fleet 
is finite, and enough countries support their endeavors. One factor that 
could change the situation would be diplomatic efforts for countries to 
cease cooperating with Sea Shepherd, particularly since many illegal and 
legal fishing trawlers support mainland China. This diplomatic strong-
arming would not be unprecedented: China has used soft power to convert 
several Caribbean and Central American nations from recognizing Taiwan 
at the United Nations to recognizing mainland China. If this occurs, then 
Sea Shepherd would likely revert to Phase II or even Phase I conditions, 
increasingly isolated from the global maritime commons.
If this does not occur, how might a Phase IV be imagined? As with any 
business model, if Sea Shepherd is to grow—particularly with its fleet—it 
will have to raise money for more managerial salaries and costs associated 
with the fleet such as fuel, maintenance, and in some cases professionals 
    CHAPTER 
FOUR
Courtesy of SeaShepherd.org
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like captains and engineers. To do this, it will have to reach out to donors  
who would have been unlikely to contribute to an earlier phase of the 
organization. Rather than endorsing a vigilante organization, more moder-
ate donors would see the benefit of an organization working with states 
to provide maritime security in a legitimate manner under the rule of law. 
A second option would be direct payment of client services from nation-
states. While this might be unpalatable to the more purist element of 
environmental activists, it has a pragmatic aspect. Countries that can’t 
afford full-time navies or coast guards would be able to contribute to Sea 
Shepherd for the platform and crew, a miniscule cost compared to the cost 
of fishing loss from IUU trawlers.
Another reality and challenge awaits Sea Shepherd in the next decade or 
two: the simple truth of mortality and its impact on heirs to the throne. For 
more than four decades, Paul Watson has built and guided Sea Shepherd. 
Although his disciples have contributed to the organization’s successes, any 
monarchy, state, business, or NGO faces a potential crisis when a long-
term leader is no longer available to provide stability. At some point, Sea 
Shepherd will be without Paul Watson. The organization must plan for 
that eventuality. The next generation of leaders—the captains and chapter 
directors—all have potential, but Peter Hammarstedt appears to have the 
experience, credibility, charisma, and respect among the organization’s 
extensive network of volunteers. With more than a decade and a half with 
the organization, he understands Watson’s goals. Given his youth (he was 
born in 1984), he also has the best chance to provide long-term stability and 
continuity of the organization. He sees a different future for Sea Shepherd, a 
future not of fouled propellers and ramming but of working in tandem with 
host nations to mitigate IUU fishing, ensure maritime security of  territorial 
waters, and working with nations and Interpol to track down illicit actors on 
the high seas.
As an NGO, Sea Shepherd illustrates how they might meet the need of 
state missions. Some within the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard might argue that 
paying attention to such an organization serves no purpose. Nevertheless, 
it is important to understand how maritime non-state actors or NGOs can 
meet the needs of their missions. Sea Shepherd has identified and, with 
sea shepherd: the evolution of an eco-vigilante  49
 to legitimized maritime capacity builder
partnered nations, has brought more than two dozen illegal fishing trawlers 
to justice, when most countries either did not have or did not want to expend 
the resources to do so. Sea Shepherd—the organization that originally 
attacked or sunk illegal trawlers in its first decades—has transitioned to a 
legitimate force multiplier for smaller nation-states in securing their seas.
It is essential to recognize the underlying reason for part of Sea Shepherd’s 
work: fish depletion due to overfishing and illegal fishing as it pertains to 
the world’s greatest threat to marine protein—China. Data compiled since 
1950 shows a disturbing reality. China has overfished its local waters, such 
as the South China Sea, and as a result has sent its fishing fleet around the 
world, seizing what it can. Conflicts over this diminishing resource include 
ramming and weapons fire with regional countries’ fishing vessels such as 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and others. In recent years, trawlers have created 
sparks in more distant waters off Chile and Argentina. Eventually, battles 
over fish will move beyond fishing vessels as China’s growing navy will be 
expected to protect its commercial fleet. Sea Shepherd’s work may simply 
be the canary in the coal mine with regard to the fight over this resource, 
just as European countries once fought over valuable spices or oil in the 
Middle East.
Finally, if policymakers seek a different method of supporting partner  
nations in maritime security but the idea of working with Sea Shepherd  
is not palatable, studying the organization as a business model may be 
useful. A think tank or other NGO might emerge to take its best elements 
and work with host nations to address the economic and national security 
implications of fish scarcity in a cost-effective manner. This is not unprece-
dented, at least not the concept of an organization focused on IUU fishing.
Discussion Questions
1.  Should the U.S. create an alternative to Sea Shepherd that can be regulated?
2.  What role could the Peace Corps, Navy Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, 
and other entities play in a government-sanctioned fisheries protection 
and capacity-building force?
3.  What are the risks to an organization of having a single charismatic 
leader? How could the organization mitigate those risks? 
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4.  What high risk/high reward and low risk/low reward courses of action 
would you suggest for Phase IV of Sea Shepherd’s evolution? What 
resources and capabilities would be necessary? 
5.  What other domains of our contemporary conflict environment might 
benefit from non-state actors operating the way that Sea Shepherd does? 
What about partnership of state institutions with these type of non-
state actors? 




Discussion Questions — from the text
CHAPTER ONE 
1.  Does the U.S. or its partners have the ability and will to replace Sea 
Shepherd capabilities with their own maritime security forces? Why or 
why not?
2.  What Sea Shepherd tactics could be emulated by the U.S. Navy or 
Coast Guard?
3.  How do you define the organization: a terrorist organization, pirate, 
eco-vigilante, private security firm, environmental activist, something 
else? Explain your reasoning.
4.  What challenges do states have working with Sea Shepherd or similar 
groups that use violence at early phases in their development? Why 
would a state be willing to cooperate with such a group? 
5.  Early in their existence, the Sea Shepherd crew were labeled pirates 
and terrorists. They later gained recognition as working in service of a 
greater good. Are there any currently existing groups you can think of 
(violent groups or peaceful NGO-type actors) that may have a chance 
of becoming partners with international institutions rather than being 
rhetorically exiled?
6.  When state actors partner with all-volunteer groups, is there a risk that 
attempting to institutionalize the work being done may damage, or 
otherwise alter, the incentive structure that made the volunteer group 
successful in the first place? 
7.  What lessons could the DoD/national security community learn from 
Watson’s commitment to persistent messaging?
8.  Does the fact that an all-volunteer organization enforcing UN rules 
imply that existing state institutions are unable or unwilling to enforce 
international norms? Are the “rule makers” setting unrealistic goals when 
it comes to enforcing those rules?
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CHAPTER TWO  
1.  What are the risks and rewards of adopting the decentralized franchising 
model discussed in Phase II? How could those risks be mitigated?
2.  Discuss the implications if a more radical group emerged with the same 
maritime interests as Sea Shepherd.
3.  Sea Shepherd gained support and legitimacy in part because of the televi-
sion show Whale Wars. Discuss the role media can play in legitimizing 
these kind of groups.
4.  What are the advantages of having many decentralized chapters instead 
of a single organization? What are the disadvantages? 
5.  Are there other volunteer organizations that use a franchising model of 
growth similar to that of Sea Shepherd? Could this model be successful for 
an organization that operates in a less dramatic and TV-friendly way?
CHAPTER THREE 
1.  Under what scenarios, if any, might the U.S. might partner with  
Sea Shepherd? 
2.  Mao’s theory of revolution also uses three phases. To what extent does 
the Sea Shepherd’s strategic development mirror those stages? How  
does it differ?
3.  One key point of Sea Shepherd’s branding is non-lethal engagements.  
If that changed, what would the repercussions be? How could they  
be mitigated?
4.  How might an illegal fishing syndicate diminish Sea Shepherd’s  
effectiveness? If a state sponsor of illegal fishing wanted to remove Sea 
Shepherd’s ships from working with partner nations, what tools might 
be at its disposal? 
5.  Does the existence of Sea Shepherd result in a net gain or loss for the 
Navy or Coast Guard of any particular country in terms of their own 
missions? Are they in any way delegitimized? 
6.  What are the ramifications (legal, political, other) of law enforcement 
personnel conducting official duty as passengers of an NGO’s vessel?  
Are they at risk of losing any sort of protected status in the event of a 
confrontation with a vessel belonging to another nation? If not, should 
they consider partnering in this manner?
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CHAPTER FOUR
1.  Should the U.S. create an alternative to Sea Shepherd that can be regulated?
2.  What role could the Peace Corps, Navy Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, 
and other entities play in a government-sanctioned fisheries protection 
and capacity-building force?
3.  What are the risks to an organization of having a single charismatic 
leader? How could the organization mitigate those risks? 
4.  What high risk/high reward and low risk/low reward courses of action 
would you suggest for Phase IV of Sea Shepherd’s evolution? What 
resources and capabilities would be necessary? 
5.  What other domains of our contemporary conflict environment might 
benefit from non-state actors operating the way that Sea Shepherd does? 
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